Summary: This article gives an overview of Australia's national military strategy for cyber space and the implied demands for a radical approach to development of our civil skills base. It then looks at developments in countries and groups of military interest to us in cyberspace. On this basis, the piece concludes with some recommendations for Australian policy.
Introduction
and privatised, Australia will need not just political leadership to maintain our civil skills base in IT, it will need radical policy measures.
In 1989, a rather prescient economist in Australia anticipated the long term trend. He wrote: the "service economy in Australia is petering out as it does not offer much scope for undertaking information-intensive projects that will expand output, income or employment, rapidly. The impact analysis also reveals conflicts between long term goals of structural change and shortterm stabilisation goals of maximising income and employment. (Karunaratne 1989: 473) .
While there have been clear advances, captured well in a 2014 report by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC 2014), development of our IT skills base is still hostage -a quarter of a century later -to an overriding political ethic of full employment and traditional notions of a work force.
In War as in Peace
A country's military capability and strategic planning cannot escape the general trend of development in its economy and human resources. While the civil sector can compensate for a 50 per cent drop in IT graduates by massive increases in work visas for non-nationals, the national security sector cannot. Australian citizenship is usually a requirement for the sector.
The low penetration rate of IT professionals in all echelons of military and strategic planning, a symptom of our desultory outcomes in information technology education, produces defence policy that looks strangely out of step with the emerging digital realities.
Recent defence policy statements describing our national level posture barely touch on the subject of cyber warfare (dependent on advanced information aggregation, analysis, and rapid exploitation for strategic strike). Our latest White Paper (Dept of Defence 2013) gives cyber warfare a primarily defensive function akin to physical protection of military command and control (C2) networks and other systems from cyber attack. In very rough terms, this represents about one per cent of military reality in the information age. It is akin to "C2 plus cyber security" when in fact leading world powers are operating a C4ISTAR vision: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance -all enabling "strategic strike in milliseconds". In Australia, key strategy documents at the national level pay almost no attention to concepts like "information operations" and the word "digital" rarely appears. Policy documents and procurement efforts of the single services are much closer to the international best practice. The 2013 Defence White Paper recalled the agreement in 2011 between the United States and Australia that the ANZUS treaty would apply to cyber attacks. It concluded as a result that Australia needed "capabilities that allow us to gain an advantage in cyberspace, guard the integrity of our information, and ensure the successful conduct of operations." It said that the "the net effect on Australia's position will depend on how well we exploit cyber power". It acknowledged that "Once deployed, our forces will need to operate as a networked force in a contested environment."
But beyond these and other references to security against cyber attacks, there is little hint that the country has a deep appreciation of the revolutionary impact of the information age in military affairs. There are many references in the White Paper to things that might relate in the most general terms to the information revolution, and its authors might refer to these to rebut  As a matter of urgency, appoint a specialist panel to analyse Australia's digital work force and to develop a new national strategy dedicated exclusively to its rapid development  Use the Chubb 21-point plan for STEM education as the foundation for that report  Use the Chubb 21-point plan for STEM education as the national benchmark for evaluating Australia's year on year educational improvements in our civil IT skills base  As a matter of urgency, commission a report on community and business attitudes to cyberspace as they pertain to national security needs. 
